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oAbstract
This paper analyses the main features and determinants of labour market reforms
in the EU over the period of 2000–2011 using the European Commission LABREF
database. The data suggests that the timing, focus, and geographical distribution of
reforms reflect the interplay between economic shocks and existing institutions.
The 2008 crisis was followed by increased policy activity in most policy domains
in a large number of EU countries, initially to cushion the impact of the crisis on
employment and incomes, subsequently to improve the adjustment capacity of
labour markets. Regression analysis indicates that reform activism is stronger in
countries with lower GDP per capita and long-standing EU membership, under
critical economic and labour market conditions, and where political costs are low.
The direction of reforms is affected by economic and labour market conditions,
available fiscal space, and by initial policy settings.
JEL classification: J20, J38, J48, J58, J68
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European Union1 Introduction
This paper analyses the main trends, features and determinants of labour market re-
forms in the European Union over the period of 2000–2011. To that purpose, use is
made of the information provided in the European Commission LABREF database,
which collects characteristics of policy measures in a wide range of labour market
fields.
Since the onset of EMU, there was clear awareness that a successful monetary
union would require reforming labour markets where needed in such a way as to
ease adjustment in the face of asymmetric shocks and to permit the correction of
macroeconomic imbalances. The need for such reforms has become urgent after
the crisis in light of the highly asymmetrical impact on the financial sector, public
finances, and the real economy of EU countries and as a consequence of the sud-
den unwinding of large external imbalances accumulated over the 2000s. After the
financial crisis, most EU countries have stepped up their reform agenda by review-
ing existing interventions to support employment and by taking action to reform
labour market institutions to foster adjustment to the major shocks materialised
since the Great Recession.2015 Turrini et al. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
riginal work is properly credited.
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the record of past reforms and assess their features, determinants and effects. Although
relevant progress has been made in recent decades in measuring the impact of different
policy settings on aggregate labour market outcomes (e.g., Nickell and Layard, 1999;
Blanchard and Wolfers 2000), the assessment of reforms remains a challenging task.
The first and most important condition for an effective assessment of reforms is ad-
equate information on the reform features and characteristics.
The aim of this paper is to describe recent reforms carried out in EU countries mak-
ing use of the LABREF database that was set up by DG ECFIN of the European
Commission in cooperation with the Economic Policy Committee of the ECOFIN
Council. This database contains information on a large set of policy measures carried
out between 2000 and 2011. As compared with other similar existing databases, it con-
tains information on a larger set of reform characteristics.
Despite limitations of count data on reform events, the evidence permits a number of
interesting insights. Countries with similar institutional settings have followed broadly
analogous reform patterns throughout the 2000s. The 2008 crisis triggered increased
policy activism in most policy domains in a large number of EU countries. In a first
phase, reforms were mainly aimed at supporting labour demand during at the start of
the recession and adapting social safety nets. In a second phase, reforms became more
intense in domains with relevance for labour market adjustment, including employment
protection legislation (EPL) and wage setting frameworks, while tax wedge and welfare
reforms became increasingly constrained by the available fiscal space in a number of
countries.
By analysing labour market reform drivers across the EU, the paper contributes to
the literature on the determinants of structural reforms and, thanks to the high degree
of detail of the LABREF database, helps digging deeper to understanding what drives
different types of reforms. Two reform indicators are considered. First, the simple
count of policy measures introduced overall and by specific policy domains. Second, a
measure of reform stance by policy domain, which takes into account in which direc-
tion the underlying policy variables are moving as a result of reforms. Despite the rela-
tively short time series available, the sample permits the carrying out of regression
analysis, which offers interesting insights.
The evidence shows that reforms were more numerous in countries with a lower
GDP per-capita at the start of the sample, suggesting that the evolution of labour mar-
ket institutions was faster in EU countries at earlier stages of economic development.
The evidence also shows that, other things being equal, reform activism was more in-
tense in countries with a longer record of EU membership.
The findings give some support to the hypothesis that crises and harsh economic and
labour market conditions are associated with an increased number of structural
reforms (Drazen and Easterly, 2001; Høj et al., 2006). A higher unemployment rate and
the presence of a large negative output gap are associated with a higher frequency of
reforms, although results depend on the specific policy domain, the relation being
strong especially for active labour market policies, EPL, early retirement and retirement
age reforms, and wage setting reforms.
There is also support for the hypothesis that, as reforms are often politically costly,
they are more likely under conditions that reduce the actual or perceived political cost
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higher immediately after elections. The evidence also moderately suggests that the frac-
tion of parliamentary seats held by the government is positively associated with re-
forms. Fiscal variables have instead a non-systematic relation with reform activism,
results depending on specific reform domains.
The reform stance variable, in line with previous evidence (Høj et al., 2006), ex-
hibits a clear relation with initial policy conditions. Reforms raising the tax burden
are less likely the higher the tax wedge on labour; those increasing the generosity
of unemployment benefits occur less often the higher are net replacement rates for
unemployment insurance; reforms increasing the degree of stringency of EPL re-
forms are less numerous if EPL is rigid to start with. Regarding EPL, it appears
that the strictness of regulation for permanent contracts makes reforms easing EPL
restrictions more likely, while the initial degree of regulation for temporary
contracts has no association either with EPL reforms in general or with reforms
targeted to temporary contracts.
The reform stance depends on labour market conditions in the expected way, with
high unemployment being associated with reforms lowering the tax burden on labour,
raising the generosity of unemployment benefits and that of active labour market pol-
icies. The LABREF database permits digging deeper into such findings and uncovers
that, over the crisis period, unemployment generosity was increased especially in terms
of entitlement conditions, while benefit duration was not increased and was actually
made tighter in a majority of cases starting from 2010.
The direction of reforms depends also on the initial fiscal position, in line with find-
ings of previous literature (e.g., Duval, 2008; Høj et al., 2006), with the relation
depending on the specific policy domain considered. With lower government deficits,
reforms tend to lower the tax burden of labour and to increase the generosity of un-
employment benefits. The data also provide some support to the view that reforms,
notably those reducing the extent of employment and wage setting regulations, are trig-
gered by financial market pressure, as measured by the interest rate spreads on govern-
ment bonds.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the measure-
ment of economic reforms and describes the LABREF database. Section 3 presents the
main trends of labour market reforms in the EU since 2000 by broad policy domains
and country groups. Section 4 studies the economic determinants of reforms, in par-
ticular by a detailed regression analysis of how the economic, political and fiscal con-
text influences the emergence of specific reforms. Section 5 concludes.2 Measuring labour market reforms
2.1 Databases tracking labour market reforms
Reform databases can either be descriptive or indicator-based. Descriptive databases
collect information on enacted reforms on the basis of pre-defined criteria with the
aim of providing an exhaustive description of the main policy measures taken. These
databases are useful especially to analyse the reform process, investigate commonalities
and characteristics of reform strategies, and analyse the effects of reforms with alterna-
tive designs and features, notably on micro data.
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existing regulations and institutions. These indicators provide a synthetic measure of
the implications of the existing stock of regulations and institutions. Reforms can only
be measured indirectly by means of time differences in these indicators. While
indicator-based databases permit a very effective synthesis of information for compari-
sons over time and across countries, which make them suited for statistical analysis on
macro data, they do not provide information at the level of the specific policy mea-
sures.
2.1.1 Descriptive databases
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) provides synthetic information on measures
adopted in the fields of minimum wages, maternity protection and working time along
with referrals to relevant regulations. The ILO also compiles the NATLEX database,
providing a comprehensive record of abstracts of legislation and relevant information of
national labour, social security and related human rights laws for over 190 countries.
The inventory of labour market reforms developed by the OECD in the framework of
the evaluation of the OECD Jobs Strategy contains information on reforms in seven
main policy areas grouped in two sub-periods (1995–1999 and 2000–2004).
The “Social Reforms Database”, developed by the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti in
cooperation with IZA (FRDB-IZA), provides information on reform measures adopted
in the EU countries starting from the eighties. The database collects information on
the main qualitative features of reforms in four broad policy areas: EPL; public pension
systems; non-employment benefits; and migration policies.
2.1.2 Indicator-based databases
Structural indicators are increasingly used in policy analysis. While providing a very
useful proxy for the extent of government intervention in the labour market, these indi-
cators raise a number of measurement issues: (i) the choice of the weight attributed to
the various aspects of regulation is somewhat arbitrary; (ii) only a subset of regulatory
aspects is taken into account, and relevant country-specific features in the design of the
regulations are not considered; (iii) the degree of enforcement of specific regulations is
often not captured.
Indicators measuring the stringency of EPL have been developed by the OECD, which
capture the most important features of regulation, both for regular and temporary con-
tracts and for collective dismissals, for most OECD countries since the eighties.
Indicators for labour market regulations are developed also in the framework of the
Fraser Institute’s “Economic Freedom around the World” database. Indices scoring the
absence of anti-competitive restrictions in a number of domains are produced for a
large number of countries across the world, starting from the seventies. The economic
freedom index for the labour market is the combination of separate indicators on mini-
mum wage, flexibility in hiring and firing, level of collective bargaining, unemployment
insurance, and the use of military conscription.
The World Bank “Doing Business” database provides scores for regulations hampering
a business-friendly environment, with an attempt to also capture information on
enforcement. Within the Doing Business framework, a number of indicators concern-
ing labour market regulations for 85 countries in the early 2000s were developed by
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short time series (it starts in 2003).
The Global Labor Survey (GLS) database (Chor and Freeman, 2005) conducted in
2004 at the Harvard Law School seeks to measure de facto labour practices around the
world, covering aspects of labour institutions such as employment regulations, em-
ployee benefits, and wage setting, and builds indices of labour practices in ten broad
areas for 33 countries.
2.2 The LABREF database
The aim of the LABREF database is to improve the information basis for surveillance
of labour market policies in the framework of the EU economic policy coordination
processes. The database was developed upon initiative of the European Commission’s
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) and the Labour
Market Working Group (LMWG) attached to the Economic Policy Committee (EPC)
of the ECOFIN Council in 2005.
LABREF is a descriptive database that records labour market and welfare policy
measures introduced in EU member states. Compared with other similar databases,
LABREF provides more information on the features and characteristics of the policy
measures. The compilation of the database for each year is carried out in two steps. In
the first step, information is collected by DG ECFIN using publicly available national
and international sources and classified according to the criteria agreed with the EPC1.
In the second step, the information collected is sent for validation to national author-
ities via the EPC.
Currently, LABREF covers policy measures for the EU-27 over the 2000–2011 period
(for Romania and Bulgaria, data start in 2003; the addition of Croatia is in progress).
Information up to 2011 has been validated by the Members of the Economic Policy
Committee of the ECOFIN Council. The database is accessible online2. The extension
to cover reforms up to 2013 is under way at the time of writing.
The measures reported in the database refer to information on enacted legislation
(approved by Parliament) as well as executive or administrative acts, court rulings, or
agreements likely to have an impact on labour market performance, including measures
entailing changes in the implementation framework of a previously adopted reform3.
Recurrent decisions by the government concerning wages, according to standard rules
and practice (notably, on the level of minimum wages or government wages), are not
included among the LABREF reform measures, while derogations to current rules and
practice as well as changes in wage setting modalities by the government are. The data-
base does not record information on discussions of planned reforms or draft bills not
yet passed4.
2.2.1 Scope and classification of reform measures
The database collects information on a wide range of policy measures having implica-
tions for the labour market. Policy measures are organised into 49 policy fields and fur-
ther grouped in 9 broad policy domains (see Appendix A). The breakdown of policy
domains and fields covered by the database reflects standard classifications of labour
market and welfare institutions (e.g., Nickell and Layard, 1999), notably labour taxation,
employment protection, unemployment benefits, wage setting, and working time
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welfare benefits, early withdrawal schemes, labour mobility, and migration policies.
2.2.2 Information on reform measures
For each policy measure, the database provides the following information:
 General description: the aim and main features of the reform are described.
Reference to the text establishing the measure is reported (budget law, decree…).
The specific information source used to fill the database is indicated.
 Year of adoption: the date when a reform measure is approved (by parliament if
legislation, by government if decree or administrative measure, by social partners if
framework agreement…).
 Timing of implementation: this corresponds to the scheduled or expected timing of
the implementation (i.e., entry into force, phasing-in…). Reforms in the planning
phase are not recorded.
 Effect on incumbents and new entrants: it is specified if the measure applies to new
entrants only or to current incumbents as well.
 Socio-economic group targeted: young people. The database identifies whether policy
initiatives target specifically the young.
 Reform packages, policy programmes: it is specified if the measure is embedded in a
long-term policy programme or part of a formal reform package.
2.2.3 Direction of reform measures
Reform measures can have different implications on the underlying policy setting. For
analytical purposes, reforms are distinguished according to their effect on the under-
lying policy setting. The classification of reform direction is kept neutral, with no a
priori judgement on their implications on labour market functioning (e.g., whether the
labour market becomes more or less “flexible”). Reform measures are classified as “in-
creasing” (resp., “decreasing“) if they have an increasing (resp., decreasing) effect on the
associated underlying policy setting, namely:
 the tax burden on labour;
 the generosity of unemployment and other benefits;
 the stringency of regulation on employment protection, wage setting, and working time;
 the availability, generosity, or effectiveness of ALMPs.
No aggregate reform stance indicator is computed, as it would be meaningless if
obtained as the sum of reforms stance indicators by domain. Appendix B details the
criteria used in defining the direction of reform measures by domain.
2.2.4 Reform measures vs. reform packages
It is important to note that reform measures recorded in the database are often nar-
rower in scope than the reform packages typically passed by parliaments as single
pieces of legislation. Complex reforms are broken down into many reform measures as
many policy fields are affected. For instance, if a complex labour market reform affects
both EPL and unemployment benefits, these will be recorded separately because they
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rate of the unemployment benefit and its duration, these will also be recorded as separ-
ate reform measures because they affect two different policy fields in the same domain.
Finally, if the same reform package contains multiple elements, some of which have an
increasing, while others a decreasing effect in the same policy field, these elements are
also recorded separately, with opposite directions5.
2.3 Creating a count database
For the purposes of the present analysis, the descriptive LABREF database is turned
into a panel count database. For each country, in each year, and each field and domain,
the total number of reforms is recorded, and the count is performed separately for re-
forms increasing and decreasing the underlying policy settings.
In the present paper, only reforms with a relevant direct impact on labour market
outcomes are considered. Immigration and mobility policies are not examined.
It is important to highlight a number of limitations of reform count data in deriving
conclusions and making judgements. First, recording a larger number of reforms in a
given country, in a given period, does not necessarily imply that more extensive or ef-
fective policy actions have been put in place. Second, some of the problems are linked
to the inevitable risk of missing information and non-obvious classification for the pol-
icy field or direction. More fundamentally, reform measures are far from being
homogenous objects. In LABREF, a reform corresponds to: (i) a change taking place in
one policy field; (ii) as a result of an autonomous legislative, executive, or administra-
tive act, or agreement, or court ruling. It follows that, while that database takes into ac-
count the possible presence of multiple measures in a single policy act (e.g., ‘umbrella
laws’, reform packages), no account is taken of the fact that reform counting can create
a bias in favour of gradual reform strategies (spread over time, in different formal acts).
3 EU labour market reforms 2000–2011: stylized facts
This section looks at the evolution of reforms and their characteristics, as well as their
distribution across different policy domains and country groups, with a view to distil a
number of stylised facts.
In the remainder of the paper, information on countries is sometimes provided in ag-
gregate form, making reference to country groups that are selected in such a way to
isolate groups of countries characterised by relatively homogenous labour market
institutions6.
3.1 The number of reform measures: broad patterns
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average number of reforms for each policy domain,
distinguishing by country groups. The height of the bars under each policy domain in-
dicates the average number of reforms in that domain which were carried out in a rep-
resentative EU country in the corresponding year. The colour code within the bars
shows the distribution of the reforms across country groups. A first look at the graphs
reveals that the frequency of policy interventions varies considerably across policy
domains. On average, most reforms were undertaken in the active labour market policy
and labour taxation domains, while early withdrawal and wage setting reforms are rela-
tively infrequent.
Fig. 1 Average number of reforms adopted by EU countries, by policy domain, year, and country group
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pears to be to a large extent linked to the increased number of reforms during the crisis,
as policy activism seems to peek in 2008–2009. Two policy domains are exceptions to
this trend: early withdrawal and working time reforms. In these domains there are sig-
nificantly less reforms during the crisis period.
When looking at the distribution of reforms across country groups, two observations
stand out. First, although reform activity is relatively broad-based and takes place to
some extent in all country groups, reforms do not always occur simultaneously in all
country groups: in some periods some country groups are more concerned than others
(Fig. 2). In particular, Southern and Continental countries had a more intense reform





2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Nordic Continental Anglo-Saxon
Southern Central and Eastern
Fig. 2 Average number of reforms adopted by EU countries, by year and country group
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country groups (Fig. 3). Continental countries were the most active in the domains of
working time and other welfare benefits. In all other remaining domains, the group of
Southern countries recorded the highest frequency of reforms, most notably in the EPL
domain. Some country groups do not undertake reforms in some policy domains for a
large part of the observed period. For example, there are very few reforms concerning
early withdrawal instruments by Anglo-Saxon countries or concerning job protection
by Nordic countries. Given that country groups are defined on the basis of similar
labour market institutions, these differences reflect the fact that the distribution of
reforms in time and across domains and country groups reflects the interplay between
shocks and the main features of existing institutions.
Across the whole sample, the distribution of reforms across policy domains appears to
be broadly stable, especially until 2008, as Fig. 4 shows. Until 2008, the only trend that
can be observed is the gradual decline in the incidence of working time and early with-
drawal reforms and a parallel increase in labour taxation and other welfare-related
benefit reforms. The latter also include short-time working schemes, which were imple-
mented simultaneously by a number of EU countries as a response to the crisis in 2008Fig. 3 Distribution of reforms across policy domains and country groups
Fig. 4 Distribution of reforms across policy domains over the years (all EU)
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“Other welfare benefits” domain, Fig. 1).
No general trend is apparent concerning the fraction of reforms targeted to the whole
population, incumbents, or new entrants only (Fig. 5): most reforms extend to the whole
population over the whole decade. Nevertheless, some specific patterns emerge: during
the mid-2000s measures were targeted mostly at new entrants in the Early WithdrawalFig. 5 Fraction of reforms aimed at new entrants and incumbents in the EU
Turrini et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:12 Page 11 of 33domain, while after the crisis reforms increasingly concerned new entrants in the Job
Protection and Unemployment Benefit domains.
3.2 The direction of reforms
Information on the direction of the policy measures provides additional insight into the
nature and purpose of labour market reforms during the last decade. Figure 6 shows
the evolution of the average number of reforms in each domain, distinguishing by dir-
ection. The bars shaded in light (green) refer to the average number of reforms in
the various domains in a given year that took place in a representative EU country and
that contributed to increasing the underlying policy settings (e.g., increasing the tax
burden, the generosity of benefits or the stringency of regulation; for a more detailed
definition of the direction of reforms, see Appendix B). Correspondingly, the bars in
dark (blue) report, on the negative portion of the vertical axis, the number of reforms
decreasing underlying policy settings that took place in a given domain and year.
A first message from Fig. 6 is that there are considerable differences across policy do-
mains regarding the direction of measures. In some policy domains, reforms normally
take place in one direction only. For instance, while most reforms strengthened
ALMPs, a large majority of reforms contributed to the reduction of labour taxation or
the stringency of regulations concerning working time. In contrast, in other domains
(job protection, unemployment benefits, wage setting) there is a more balanced distri-
bution of reforms in terms of direction of their effects on underlying policy settings
over the period.
A second observation is that a reversion in the direction of a number of reforms took
place over the crisis period. Reforms concerning labour taxes and unemployment and
other welfare benefits were generally aimed at raising generosity at the start of the
crisis, but the direction changed since 2010: the tightening of government budgetsFig. 6 Direction of reforms by domain and year (average number of reforms adopted across the EU)
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benefits generosity. In this same period, reforms reducing the extent of regulations
concerning EPL, wage setting, and working time became more frequent, confirming
the evolution of reform priorities as the consequences of the crisis unfolded and
the need to enhance the capacity of labour market adjustment became more
pressing.
3.3 The two phases of the reform response after the crisis
Overall, the descriptive evidence suggests that following the crisis, the reform response
was characterised by two distinct phases reflecting the evolution of priorities and
constraints.
▪ At the end of the post-crisis recession (the 2008–2009 period), reforms became more
frequent in the domains of active labour market policies, labour taxation, other
welfare-related benefits, and unemployment benefits. The broad aim of the measures
put in place in this first phase was that of cushioning the labour market impact of the
recession, notably by preventing excessive job shedding in the face of a shock
perceived as mostly temporary and by strengthening social safety nets. Labour taxes
were most often reduced and benefits made more generous. Including following the
recommendations in EU Economic Recovery Package, a number of countries put in
place or beefed up existing short-time working schemes (recorded among “Other
welfare-related benefits”) with the purpose of cushioning the impact of the crisis on
firms' labour costs while containing job shedding.
▪ In a second phase after the crisis (the 2010–2011 period), a different composition of
reforms by domain becomes visible. As the crisis dragged on, labour market reforms
became more frequent in the domain of job protection, wage setting, and working time,
notably in Southern European countries. Reforms in these fields were more often
leading in the direction of reducing regulations. Benefits were made more generous
overall, while labour taxation was raised in a number of countries. On the one hand,
the perception that the crisis involved a persistent aggregate demand contraction,
especially in countries concerned by current account reversals and debt crises,
prompted reforms aimed at improving the adjustment capacity of the labour market,
including within the framework of financial assistance programmes. On the other
hand, the perception of tightening fiscal constraints implied a reduced frequency of
measures aimed at cushioning the labour market impact of the crisis via the budget
(tax wedge reductions, active and passive labour market policies).
3.4 Taking a closer look: policy fields, cross-country comparisons
To obtain a more detailed picture of patterns and trends in reforms, it is worthwhile to
look at policy fields with the most relevant macro-structural impact: those in the un-
employment benefit, job protection, and wage setting policy domains.
Figure 7 shows the frequency and direction of reforms in policy fields within the un-
employment benefits domain. It reveals that most measures modifying the duration of
benefits were increasing generosity in 2009, while generosity was phased out subse-
quently, which seems consistent with the objective of tackling the risk of benefit
dependency. Eligibility conditions for benefits were instead predominantly extended
Fig. 7 Direction of reforms in the unemployment benefit domain (average number of reforms across the EU)
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workers. The balance between measures raising and reducing replacement rates shifted
as the crisis unfolded: initially a higher number of measures raised benefits; as the crisis
dragged on, measures reducing benefits became relatively more frequent, partially as a
result of tightening public budgets.
Figure 8 shows the frequency and direction of reforms within the job protection
(EPL) domain. It reveals an increased frequency of reforms addressing the EPL regime
for permanent contracts since 2006, with measures pointing in both directions. How-
ever, starting from 2009, the incidence of measures reducing EPL clearly overtook that
of measures raising EPL restrictiveness, consistently with the increasing need to tackle
labour market adjustment. Regarding fixed-term contracts, in the past decade theFig. 8 Direction of reforms in the job protection domain (average number of reforms across the EU)
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sures tightening conditions, which may reflect, in a number of cases, a gradual adjust-
ment to past reforms relaxing conditions for fixed term contracts with the implication
of raising employment while at the same time creating segmentation.
The time evolution of measures affecting wage setting, previously highlighted for the
whole domain of wage setting frameworks (including also social pacts and tripartite
agreements), is even clearer when focusing exclusively on government intervention
aimed at reforming the wage setting system (Fig. 9). This evidence suggests a shift in
the positioning of governments on the wage-employment trade-off during periods of
high unemployment (crisis years).
Figure 10 compares reform directions across countries within each policy domain.
The comparison of reform patterns within homogenous country groups reveal some
similarities, thus confirming that institutional factors play a role in driving reform pat-
terns. However, even within country groups, the direction of reforms is quite heteroge-
neous for unemployment benefit and wage setting reforms. Anglo-Saxon countries
barely reduced job protection, while Southern countries frequently carried out such
types of reforms. Eastern and Continental countries quite frequently put in place
generosity-decreasing welfare benefit reforms. In Continental countries, measures
aimed at easing working time regulation were comparatively more frequent.
3.5 Comparing LABREF to other databases
To benchmark the information from LABREF, a comparison was performed with
the only analogous database, namely, the Social Reforms Database compiled by the
Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti and IZA (henceforth, FRDB-IZA database)7. The
coverage of LABREF and FRDB-IZA data overlap only partially. The FRDB-IZA data-
base contains information for 14 EU countries over the period 1980–2007 (the 15 EU
countries before the 2004 enlargement bar Luxemburg); LABREF covers EU-27 coun-
tries (all but Croatia) over the period 2000–2011. Hence, the comparison is made for
the 14 EU countries contained in the FRDB-IZA database for the 2000–2007 period.
To make the comparison possible, five comparable policy ‘subdomains’ were created
as follows: active labour market policies (ALMP); employment protection legislation































Fig. 9 Government intervention in wage setting (average number of reforms across the EU)
Fig. 10 Direction of reforms by policy domain and country (average annual number of reforms over the
2000–2011 period)
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from the two databases. The overall correlation between the number of reforms
recorded in both databases is 0.5. Correlation coefficients across subdomains vary
between 0.31 (Other Welfare Benefits) and 0.64 (Unemployment Benefits), correl-
ation coefficients across countries vary between 0.22 (UK) and 0.74 (Belgium).
While these coefficients indicate a fair degree of correlation between the number
of reforms recorded in both databases, the fact that the correlation is not perfect
could be linked to differences in the criteria followed to identify reforms as separ-
ate units8.
The information from the LABREF database has also been compared to information
obtained from quantitative indicators of labour market policy, namely, the tax wedge,
the net replacement rate of unemployment benefits, the EPL indicator for regular
Table 1 Correlation between reform numbers in LABREF and FRDB-IZA databases (14 EU countries,
2000–2007)
ALMP EPL Early withdrawal Unemployment benefits Welfare benefits Overall (a)
AT 0.844 0.861 0.889 0.726 0.258 0.731
BE 0.241 0.701 −0.204 1.000 0.845 0.744
DE −0.299 0.958 0.788 0.400 −0.730 0.457
DK 0.703 N.A. (b) 0.174 0.905 −0.143 0.519
EL 0.500 −0.083 N.A. (b) 0.822 0.726 0.448
ES 0.097 0.784 0.596 0.680 0.556 0.491
FI 0.921 0.655 0.000 0.962 0.487 0.582
FR 0.823 0.433 0.293 0.197 0.641 0.603
IE 0.746 0.593 0.417 0.655 0.881 0.645
IT 0.278 0.149 N.A. (b) 0.527 N.A. (b) 0.379
NL 0.128 −0.204 0.040 0.165 −0.267 0.169
PT −0.195 0.726 0.354 0.957 0.635 0.707
SE 0.659 0.284 0.447 0.383 0.749 0.479
UK 0.322 −0.314 −0.249 N.A. (b) 0.567 0.218
Overall (a) 0.522 0.390 0.365 0.637 0.313 0.503
Notes. (a) Overall correlations are run across the number of reforms as reported by different sources, with reform
domains ‘stacked’ in a single vector, and differ from the averages of correlations by domain
(b) The correlation is missing whenever at least one of the datasets records zero reforms over the whole period.
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GDP). To take into account the fact that in a given year, in a given country, different
reforms may coexist with different directions, a “reform stance” variable is generated as
the number of reforms with increasing direction net of the number of reforms with de-
creasing direction in a given policy domain. (For an exact definition of increasing and
decreasing reforms by policy domain, see Appendix B).
In Table 2, simple correlations have been calculated across the whole available
panel between the change of the policy indicators and the LABREF reform stance in
the relevant policy domain. The correlations are calculated so as to see whether
reform measures adopted in a given year have an effect on policy indicators in the
next calendar year. Table 2 shows that the LABREF reform stance variables are
positively correlated to changes in the related policy indicators. The correlations are
modest but reasonable (ranging between 0.1 and 0.3) and are statistically significant
with the exception of the EPL indicator for regular workers.Table 2 Correlation of LABREF reform stance in relevant domain with change in policy indicator
(2000–2011)
Policy Indicator Reform stance in policy domain Correlation P-value of test
of no corr.
No. of countries
Tax wedge Labour taxation 0.26 0.00 27
Net replacement rate of UB Unemployment benefits 0.12 0.06 27
ALMP spending (% GDP) ALMP 0.25 0.00 20
EPL indicator (regular contracts) EPL 0.10 0.14 21
Source: LABREF reform stance: number of reforms in “increasing” direction minus number of reforms in the “decreasing”
direction. For the definition of reform direction, see Appendix B. For the exact definition and source of policy variables,
see Appendix C.
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reform stance and changes in policy indicators may not be expected. First, the
reforms stance indicator does not differentiate between measures with different
scope and degree of ambition. Second, some aspects of labour market reforms are
not taken into account in quantitative policy indicators (e.g., coverage and condi-
tionality of unemployment benefits are not taken into account in the net replace-
ment rate indicator). Finally, the time of recording of measures in the LABREF
classification may not always coincide with the one used to update synthetic quanti-
tative policy indicators.4 Searching for the determinants of labour market reforms
The degree of specification of the measures collected in LABREF permits deepen-
ing insights into reform determinants. Before moving to multivariate regression
analysis, bivariate correlations help provide prima facie evidence on a number of
questions as follows. When and where are labour market reforms more likely to
take place? What are the characteristics of countries exhibiting higher reform in-
tensity? During which periods are reforms more frequent? What factors trigger re-
forms? Before a systematic regression analysis, some pieces of bivariate analysis are
offered.4.1 Some basic bivariate correlations
The co-movement between the number of reforms and unemployment suggests that
reforms tend to be more frequent in periods when joblessness is high or on the rise
(Fig. 11). This is particularly evident after the 2008 recession in most countries. The
graph shows, however, that the timing of the policy response differs somewhat across
countries, with some cases increased reform action takes place with some lag after the
increase in unemployment (e.g., Ireland, Portugal), and in other cases reform activism
was intense already before the occurrence of periods on unemployment growth (e.g.,
Spain, France).
The longer-term relation between unemployment and reforms can be captured by a
cross-country scatterplot. Figure 12 confirms the expected relation. The average reform
intensity over the sample period tends to be higher in countries characterized, on
average, by a higher unemployment rate. The cross-country positive relation between
reforms and unemployment is quite strong, post-transition Poland and Slovakia being
outliers in light of the high unemployment rates in early 2000s.
A number of additional cross-country correlations of interest appear, as reported in
Table 3. Correlates considered include labour market outcomes and other macro-fiscal
relevant characteristics, such as income per capita, GDP growth, debt, and fiscal stance.
As expected, unsatisfactory labour market outcomes are correlated with more intense
reform activity. Reforms are notably more frequent in countries with high unemploy-
ment. Reforms are also more frequent in countries with segmented labour markets. Re-
forms appear to be less frequent in countries with a high growth rate. As for income
per capita, the relation is negative but weak. Finally, countries with higher government
debt and, to a lesser extent, those with a higher deficit appear to implement more
reforms on average, while the correlation between the change of the fiscal stance over
Fig. 11 Number of reform measures and the unemployment rate
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porting the often claimed trade-off between fiscal consolidation and reforms)9.4.2 Regression analysis
4.2.1 Empirical strategy
We analyse the determinants of both the number and direction of reforms. In the spirit
of previous studies on the determinants of labour market reforms (e.g., Duval, 2008),
explanatory variables include controls for structural country characteristics, the eco-
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Fig. 12 Average number of reforms and unemployment, 2000–2011
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sample period, a dummy taking the value one for countries that acceded the EU in
2004 or later and a fixed exchange rate dummy taking value one in cases (countries
and years) where the exchange rate arrangement is either a monetary union or a cur-
rency board. The first two variables aim at capturing, respectively, the link between
institutional and economic development and that between the transformation of do-
mestic institutions and EU accession. The exchange rate regime is expected to matter
as well. According to the standard expectation, in the absence of the exchange rate as a
shock absorber, reforms, including in the labour market field, need to substitute by en-
hancing the responsiveness of wages and prices to shocks (e.g., Bean, 1998). It has
also been argued, however, that incentives for reforms in a monetary union could be
ambiguous, as the reduction in the inflation bias of monetary policy linked to mon-
etary union participation can reduce the urgency of reforms reducing structural un-
employment (Calmfors, 2001).
Controls for the economic situation include the unemployment rate and a dummy
variable for deep recessions which, following Duval (2008), takes the value of one if theTable 3 Reform intensity and country characteristics: cross-country correlations (EU27, 2000–2011)
Corr. with no. of reforms P-value of test of no corr.
Labour market outcomes
Unemployment rate 0.41 0.03
Employment rate −0.30 0.13
Share of temporary employment (% of total) 0.20 0.31
Share of long-term unemployment (% of total) 0.31 0.11
Other macro-fiscal variables
Real GDP per capita, euro −0.04 0.83
Real GDP growth −0.46 0.02
Government debt/GDP 0.57 0.00
Government net lending −0.20 0.32
Change in cyclically adjusted net lending −0.09 0.66
Notes: (1) Spearman rank correlations of averages over the period 2000–2011. (2) Number of observations (countries): 27
Source: Labour market outcomes: Eurostat; Other macro-fiscal variables: AMECO database, DG ECFIN, European Commission.
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activity is more intense in countries that experience bad economic outcomes. However,
it needs to be acknowledged that the number and direction of reforms can be affected
in different ways by the economic context depending on the specific policy field. For in-
stance, it could be expected that in bad times reforms tend to reduce the tax wedge
and the stringency of regulations to boost job creation, while increasing the generosity
of unemployment benefits to adapt social safety nets to a situation of protracted labour
demand slack.
Variables capturing political costs include controls for the election cycle (an election
year dummy and a dummy equal to 1 if elections took place in the previous year) and
the fraction of parliamentary seats controlled by the government10. It is expected that
there are fewer reforms in election years and more reforms in the year after the elec-
tion when a new government starts implementing its policies. A large parliamentary
majority for the government may facilitate reform activity.
Fiscal conditions are controlled for by means of the general government budget
balance. The expectation is that, in the case of reforms that are costly to the budget, a
larger fiscal space favours reforms. The spread with respect to Germany of real interest
rates on 10 year government bonds is also included as a measure of markets’ percep-
tion of fiscal conditions11. The expected effect of such a variable is not obvious. On the
one hand, higher spreads may signal stronger market pressure to reform. On the other
hand, they are associated with a reduced fiscal space to accommodate reforms with an
impact on the budget. Another hypothesis that has often been put to the test is that fis-
cal consolidation makes reforms less likely by reducing the political capital available to
governments. We have not pursued that route as, in our sample, fiscal consolidation
measures raise a strong suspicion of endogeneity, especially with reform measures with
an impact on the budget, but also with those reforms that were triggered during the
crisis in a context of capital flight, revenue losses linked to deep recessions, and bond
market tensions, where governments had to respond simultaneously by tightening the
budget and stepping up the reform agenda.
Time-specific factors are captured by year fixed effects. The variation in the regres-
sion analysis takes place especially across countries, although variation along the time
dimension is also present to the extent that year effects only account for intercept het-
erogeneity. In light of the short time series dimension of the dataset, explanatory vari-
ables are not instrumented, and possible endogeneity issues (likely to be present
especially for the unemployment variable) are addressed by taking lagged values of the
explanatory variables.
4.2.2 Assessing the determinants of the number of reform measures
Table 4 reports results on the determinants of the overall number of reforms. The first
specification is estimated on pooled data without year effects. Reforms are more fre-
quent in countries that had a lower per-capita GDP at the start of the sample, which
may reveal the tendency for economic and institutional development to go hand in
hand. The fact that countries acceded recently to the EU has instead a negative associ-
ation with the number of labour market reform measures implemented, conditional on
the level of economic development. Strong support is found for the hypothesis that re-
forms are more frequent in crisis years and that political costs matter: during election
Table 4 Determinants of the total number of labour market reforms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Overall number of reforms
Per-capita GDP in 2000 −0.188*** −0.181*** −0.157***
(0.053) (0.050) (0.046)
New Member State (dummy) −5.497*** −5.966*** −5.761***
(1.264) (1.221) (1.180)
Unemployment rate (1st lag) 0.034 0.179* 0.186** 0.178
(0.090) (0.091) (0.086) (0.171)
Output gap < −4 (dummy) 4.343*** 2.943* 3.275
(1.175) (1.709) (2.018)
Year > 2007 (dummy) 3.389***
(0.708)
Parliamentary election year (dummy) −1.858*** −2.165*** −2.167*** −2.116***
(0.673) (0.648) (0.682) (0.653)
1 year after parl. elections (dummy) 0.969 0.720 0.632 0.702
(0.784) (0.759) (0.740) (0.732)
Fraction of seats held by the government in Parliament 9.867*** 7.758** 6.506* 2.812
(3.728) (3.503) (3.483) (3.773)
Fixed exchange rate (dummy) 0.413 −0.184 0.045 0.340
(0.609) (0.602) (0.580) (1.367)
Real interest rate spread (1st lag) 0.070 0.030 0.066 0.098
(0.116) (0.115) (0.139) (0.143)
Net lending general government (1st lag) −0.129* −0.050 −0.123 −0.109
(0.070) (0.077) (0.079) (0.094)
Year dummies No No Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No Yes
Observations 302 302 302 302
R-squared 0.225 0.258 0.322 0.383
Notes: (1) OLS regressions. (2) The sample includes EU-27 countries for the period 2000–2011. (3) Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Asterisks indicate estimated coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*)
level. (4) See Appendix C for the definition and the source of explanatory variables.
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previous year has a positive effect on reforms, albeit not significantly. The fraction of
seats in the parliament held by the government is also positively and significantly linked
to reform activity. Fiscal variables have a weak effect on overall reform activity: larger
deficits and higher interest rate spreads are associated with more reform measures,
although the latter is not statistically significant.
The specification reported in Column 2 of Table 4 includes a dummy variable
taking the value 1 after year 2007 (i.e., after the financial crisis triggered by the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) as an alternative to the dummy variable based on
a negative output gap. The post-2007 crisis dummy is highly significant, suggesting
that the increase in reform intensity observed after the burst in the financial crisis
could be partly linked to the tendency of reforms to be more numerous in coun-
tries affected by deep crises.
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year dummies are introduced to control for common trends in reform activity across
countries, including the simultaneous increase in reforms observed after the financial
crisis. The inclusion of year effects is strongly supported by the F-test. Results are
somewhat affected as compared with the specification estimated on pooled data in
column 1. The unemployment variable becomes clearly significant, and the output gap
dummy variable shows a drop in the coefficient, remaining however significant. Elec-
tions remain highly significant, while the effect of fiscal variables turns out insignificant
after the inclusion of year dummies.
Column 4 displays an alternative specification including also a full set of country
effects, on top of year effects, which imply the dropping of time-invariant variables. All
coefficients (except that of parliamentary seats held by the government) remain very
close to the ones estimated without country effects, but the precision of the estimation
decreases in light of reduced degrees of freedom. All in all, we interpret the results of
this alternative specification as support for the robustness of our results and proceed
by estimating the rest of the results in specifications including year effects but not
country effects.
Table 5 reports determinants of the number of reform measures separately by policy
domain. The specification is the same as that in column (3) of Table 4, which includes
year dummies.
It is confirmed that countries at an early stage of development and with a longer rec-
ord or EU membership have been more active in reforming, with the evidence holding
especially for tax and benefit systems. Fixed exchange rate regimes have a generally
weak and insignificant effect on reform activity, except for the Wage Setting domain,
which is associated with a higher number of reform measures.
Unemployment has a positive effect on the number of reforms in all policy areas but
one, and is statistically significant for Early Withdrawal and ALMP reforms. Deep crises
are generally associated with a higher number of reforms, statistically significant in the
EPL and Wage Setting domains, but significantly fewer reforms of Other Welfare
Benefits.
Election years are associated with fewer reforms in all domains, significantly for the
majority of domains. The fact that elections took place in the previous year generally is
linked with increased reform activity, significantly so for Early Withdrawal schemes
and reforms in the Wage Setting system, while a significant negative relation is found
for Labour Taxation. The fraction of seats held by the government has a positive rela-
tion with reform activity in most domains, but statistical significance is only reached in
the Labour Taxation domain.
The effect of fiscal variables is not uniform across policy domains. Budget deficits are
associated with more reform measures in the majority of domains (statistically signifi-
cantly for Other Welfare Benefits and Wage Setting) but fewer measures in the domain
of Early Withdrawal. High interest rate spreads are associated with more reforms on
ALMP’s but fewer measures in Wage Setting.
Overall, the drivers of the number of reforms appear to differ to some extent depend-
ing on the specific policy domain, but common features emerge which are broadly
consistent with the basic patterns highlighted by the analysis of the drivers of the over-
all number of reforms.
Table 5 Determinants of the number of reform measures, by policy domain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: number of reforms by domain Labour Taxation Unemp. Benefits Other Welfare Benefits ALMP EPL Early Withdrawal Wage Setting Working Time
Per-capita GDP in 2000 −0.050** −0.030*** 0.005 −0.022 −0.028** −0.013** −0.014 −0.006
(0.020) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012)
New Member State (dummy) −1.386*** −0.680*** −0.279 −1.709*** −0.594** −0.431*** −0.384* −0.297
(0.421) (0.218) (0.254) (0.492) (0.281) (0.127) (0.219) (0.274)
Unemployment rate (1st lag) 0.004 −0.008 0.031 0.067* 0.032 0.035** 0.008 0.017
(0.031) (0.021) (0.023) (0.039) (0.029) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019)
Output gap < −4 (dummy) 0.979 0.229 −1.105*** 1.008 0.916* −0.050 1.050** −0.084
(0.685) (0.348) (0.299) (0.796) (0.546) (0.169) (0.517) (0.363)
Parliamentary election year −0.532** −0.284** −0.260* −0.563* −0.204 −0.018 −0.064 −0.242*
(0.237) (0.136) (0.148) (0.334) (0.172) (0.083) (0.118) (0.142)
1 year after parl. elections −0.508** 0.195 −0.053 −0.024 0.341 0.176* 0.299** 0.206
(0.258) (0.190) (0.172) (0.303) (0.223) (0.103) (0.130) (0.174)
Fraction of seats held by the government in Parliament 2.129* −0.249 1.357 1.714 0.700 −0.357 0.054 1.157
(1.236) (0.723) (0.905) (1.553) (0.918) (0.461) (0.442) (0.841)
Fixed exchange rate dummy −0.268 0.056 0.142 −0.178 0.015 −0.036 0.185* 0.131
(0.232) (0.144) (0.130) (0.267) (0.181) (0.074) (0.100) (0.130)
Real interest rate spread (1st lag) 0.024 −0.017 0.018 0.091* −0.017 −0.007 −0.044* 0.018
(0.040) (0.031) (0.024) (0.055) (0.041) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026)
Net lending of general government (1st lag) 0.005 0.033 −0.057** −0.014 −0.045 0.019* −0.035* −0.030
(0.030) (0.023) (0.027) (0.035) (0.029) (0.010) (0.021) (0.025)
Observations 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302
R-squared 0.180 0.090 0.214 0.230 0.189 0.147 0.239 0.086
Notes: (1) OLS regressions with year dummies. (2) The sample includes EU-27 countries for the period 2000–2011. (3) Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate estimated coefficients that are statistically
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The previous analysis helps understanding the drivers of reform activism in labour pol-
icy domains but does not shed light on the determinants of the direction of reforms.
With a view to fill this gap, Table 6 analyses the determinants of the reform stance indi-
cator for each policy domain. The same specification as in Table 5 is maintained. This
permits the checking of whether the same factors that explain reform activism also
imply a certain direction for the reform process.
GDP per capita at the start of the period is generally not significant as an explanatory
variable. Member States acceded in 2004 or later have recorded a lower pace of in-
crease in the generosity of ALMPs and Other Welfare Benefits, possibly because these
policies require establishing governance frameworks that were in some cases not
equally available in some New Members States as in other EU countries. The evidence
appears consistent with the hypothesis that fixed exchange rates make flexicurity-type
reforms more necessary: the fixed exchange rate dummy is associated with reforms
making benefits more generous and regulations regarding EPL, wage setting, and work-
ing time less stringent (albeit with a non-significant coefficient).
As expected, higher unemployment is associated with a reform stance leaning
towards an increased generosity of unemployment benefits and extensions of
ALMPs. The reform stance in Labour Taxation is instead strongly negatively re-
lated to the unemployment rate. Quite intuitively, deep crises are linked to reforms
towards less regulated Wage Setting systems and more generous Active Labour
Market Policies. Episodes of large and negative output gaps are associated with an
increased need to improve the responsiveness of wage setting to the labour market
slack and to re-train and re-qualify the long-term unemployed and re-integrate into
the labour force those that have dropped out of the labour force. Deep crises are
also associated to less generous Other Welfare Benefits. Episodes of output gaps
below minus 4% are often associated with situations of protractedly high
unemployment. In those conditions, benefit generosity (particularly Short-Time
Working Schemes) is often brought back to its previous level to prevent benefit
dependency after having been increased during the years where unemployment has
been building up.
Interestingly, election variables are generally non-significant, with the exception of
the case of EPL reforms: the evidence suggests that reforms reducing the stringency of
EPL reforms are more likely to be carried just after elections. Also the fraction of seats
in the Parliament held by the government seldom achieves statistical significance,
except for reforms reducing the generosity of Early Withdrawal schemes.
The interest rate spread is generally non-significant, but high spreads appear signifi-
cantly associated with reforms extending ALMPs and reducing the generosity of Early
Withdrawal Schemes. Interest spreads also appear associated with reforms reducing
regulations in wage setting and working time, although not significantly. The coefficient
for EPL reforms is instead positive, meaning that higher spreads are linked with re-
forms making EPL more stringent.
The evidence suggests that the reform stance is also determined by the available
fiscal space: the government budget balance is positively associated with reforms
reducing the tax wedge on labour and increasing the generosity of unemployment
benefits.
Table 6 Determinants of reform stance, by policy domain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: reform stance by domain Labour Taxation Unemp. Benefits Other Welfare Benefits ALMP EPL Early Withdrawal Wage Setting Working Time
Per-capita GDP in 2000 −0.001 −0.005 −0.006 −0.030 0.006 −0.006 0.012 −0.005
(0.018) (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
New Member State (dummy) 0.333 −0.094 −0.512** −1.784*** 0.233 −0.133 0.293 −0.030
(0.371) (0.215) (0.222) (0.493) (0.213) (0.125) (0.188) (0.220)
Unemployment rate (1st lag) −0.084*** 0.030* 0.029 0.067* −0.003 0.008 0.020 −0.007
(0.030) (0.016) (0.018) (0.038) (0.027) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
Output gap < −4 (dummy) 1.017 −0.349 −1.062*** 1.295* −0.042 0.238** −1.029** −0.239
(0.704) (0.298) (0.328) (0.760) (0.354) (0.111) (0.468) (0.296)
Parliamentary election year (dummy) 0.004 0.099 −0.171 −0.512 −0.056 0.005 0.028 0.011
(0.213) (0.121) (0.140) (0.326) (0.135) (0.077) (0.091) (0.123)
1 year after parl. elections (dummy) 0.023 −0.239 −0.040 0.019 −0.324* 0.006 −0.005 −0.123
(0.226) (0.173) (0.167) (0.293) (0.174) (0.107) (0.133) (0.166)
Fraction of seats held by the government in Parliament −1.362 0.055 1.116 1.678 0.509 −1.053** 0.131 −0.562
(1.072) (0.693) (0.881) (1.502) (0.614) (0.425) (0.521) (0.772)
Fixed exchange rate (dummy) 0.058 0.228* 0.250** −0.124 −0.061 0.039 −0.033 −0.104
(0.201) (0.134) (0.125) (0.260) (0.139) (0.069) (0.090) (0.120)
Real interest rate spread (1st lag) −0.004 −0.029 0.023 0.103** 0.015 −0.035*** −0.001 −0.010
(0.041) (0.026) (0.025) (0.051) (0.030) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024)
Net lending of general government (1st lag) −0.104*** 0.039** 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.031 0.016
(0.035) (0.017) (0.020) (0.039) (0.016) (0.010) (0.019) (0.020)
Observations 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302
R-squared 0.186 0.091 0.201 0.246 0.115 0.077 0.223 0.078
Notes: (1) OLS regressions with year dummies. (2) The sample includes EU-27 countries for the period 2000–2011. (3) Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate estimated coefficients that are statistically
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icies and institutions. Existing analyses have shown that institutional settings exhibit a
certain degree of stability. By regressing the change in labour market policy indicators
on their initial levels, negative coefficients are generally obtained (e.g., Høj et al., 2006).
This means that a certain domain is less likely to become more regulated if regulations
are already very stringent.
Table 6 omits the initial state of policies and institutions among the explanatory variables,
the reason being that a similar indicator is not available for most of the policy domains
considered. It is possible however to recover this indicator for selected domains.
Table 7 presents results for the determinants of the direction of reforms in the do-
mains of Labour Taxation, Unemployment Benefits, and EPL taking into account initial
policy levels. Initial policy levels are summarised by the level of the tax wedge, the net
replacement rate of unemployment benefits, and the summary indicator of the strict-
ness of regulation in the EPL domain (all collected by the OECD). Since the OECD
indicators are not available for all countries and years, the number of observations
decreases in these specifications.
Table 7 shows that the reform stance is affected negatively, and significantly, by
the initial policy level in all three domains. This means that there are more
reform measures reducing the tax burden on labour the higher the starting level
of the tax wedge; there are more reform measures reducing the generosity of
unemployment benefits if the net replacement rate is already high; and there are
more reforms reducing employment protection legislation when the protection of
regular workers is high (while the effect of the protection of temporary workers is
close to zero and is not statistically significant). Other results are in line with
those in the baseline specification displayed in Table 6, except for what concerns
the interest rate spread. This variable exhibits a negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient in the EPL equation, meaning that market pressure is linked to
reforms reducing the extent of EPL regulation. This result, however, is driven to a
large extent by the shrinking of the sample when including the lagged EPL index
in the specification.
The LABREF database permits digging deeper into the terms of reform typologies
and to investigate the determinants of certain types of reforms within a given domain.
The last column of Table 7 considers EPL reforms affecting temporary contacts only. It
is shown that, for this policy field, the initial policy level has no relevance for the direc-
tion of reform. Since the sample includes time periods with exceptionally high and ris-
ing unemployment in many countries, a possible interpretation of this result is that, in
an environment characterised by high unemployment and low job creation, reforms ad-
dressing segmentation are less likely to take place via more stringent regulation for the
use of temporary contracts, even in countries with particularly loose protection of tem-
porary labour.
5 Conclusions
The European Commission LABREF database allows for tracking labour market re-
forms across the EU in a large number of policy fields. This paper reviews trends and
patterns of reforms in in the EU over the 2000s and provides an investigation of main
determinants.
Table 7 Determinants of reform stance, selected domains, with controls for initial policy levels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: reform
stance by domain
Labour Taxation Unempl. Benefits EPL EPL (temp. contracts)
Per-capita GDP in 2000 −0.036 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005
(0.022) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009)
New Member State (dummy) −0.538 −0.359 0.194 −0.169
(0.495) (0.292) (0.368) (0.190)
Unemployment rate (1st lag) −0.105** 0.019 −0.030 0.011
(0.043) (0.021) (0.035) (0.022)
Output gap < −4 (dummy) 1.203 −0.420 0.104 0.109
(0.738) (0.324) (0.385) (0.230)
Parliamentary election year (dummy) 0.022 0.105 0.047 0.001
(0.249) (0.154) (0.159) (0.113)
1 year after parl. elections (dummy) 0.126 −0.334 −0.253 −0.040
(0.266) (0.221) (0.211) (0.121)
Fraction of seats held by the
government in Parliament
−0.878 −0.764 1.375 0.617
(1.199) (1.089) (0.886) (0.515)
Fixed exchange rate (dummy) −0.129 0.237 −0.082 −0.103
(0.223) (0.179) (0.210) (0.096)
Real interest rate spread (1st lag) 0.011 −0.012 −0.096** −0.083***
(0.046) (0.032) (0.038) (0.026)
Net lending of general government
(1st lag)
−0.091** 0.043** 0.012 −0.004
(0.041) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013)
Tax wedge (1st lag) −0.032**
(0.014)
Net replacement rate of








temporary contracts (1st lag)
0.030 −0.015
(0.088) (0.052)
Observations 241 229 222 222
R-squared 0.229 0.113 0.179 0.110
Notes: (1) OLS regressions with year dummies. (2) The sample includes EU-27 countries for which the policy indicators
are available for the period 2000–2011. (3) Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate estimated coefficients that
are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. (4) See Appendix B for the definition of the dependent
variable. See Appendix C for the definition and the source of explanatory variables.
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economic shocks and existing labour market institutions. The 2008 crisis triggered
reforms in most policy domains in a large number of EU countries. In a first phase,
reforms were mostly aimed at cushioning the impact of the crisis on employment; in a
second phase, reforms aimed at increasing the adjustment capacity of labour markets
(EPL, working time, wage setting) became more frequent, while reforms reducing the
labour taxation or raising entitlements became less frequent in light of tightening
budget constraints.
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of labour market reforms carried out in a given year) and of the reform stance (the dir-
ection taken by policy settings as a result of reform activity). When analysing reform
determinants by means of panel regressions including year effects, a number of results
stand out:
 The evolution of labour market institutions was faster in EU countries at earlier
stages of economic development. No significant relation between GDP per capita
and reform direction is found instead. Reform activism was more intense in
countries with a longer record of EU membership; ALMPs and other benefits
where made more generous especially in these countries. A fixed exchange rate
has generally no significant relation with reform activism, but there is mild
evidence in favour of a direction of reforms consistent with the flexicurity
principle.
 Harsh economic and labour market conditions are associated with an increased
number of structural reforms, especially for active labour market policies, EPL,
early retirement and retirement age reforms, and wage setting reforms. The reform
stance also depends on labour market conditions in the expected way, with high
unemployment being associated with reforms lowering the tax burden on labour
and raising the generosity of unemployment benefits and that of active labour
market policies.
 Reforms appear significantly less numerous in election years, while the
relation of political variables with the reform stance is generally weak. This
suggests that reform activism per se is perceived as imprudent in election
years.
 Fiscal variables have a non-systematic relation with reform activism; results
depend on specific reform domains. The reform stance instead depends
on labour market conditions in the expected way: with lower government
deficits, reforms tend to lower the tax wedge and to raise unemployment
benefits. The data also provide some mild support to the view that reforms,
notably those reducing the extent of employment and wage setting regulations,
are triggered by financial market pressure, as measured by the change in interest
rate spreads on government bonds.
 The reform stance variable, in line with previous evidence, shows a strong
link with initial policy conditions. Reforms raising the tax burden are less
likely the higher the tax wedge on labour; those increasing the generosity
of unemployment benefits occur less often the higher are net replacement
rates for unemployment insurance; reforms increasing the degree of stringency
of EPL reforms are less numerous if EPL for regular contracts is rigid. However,
EPL reforms targeted to temporary contracts are not linked to the initial degree
of regulation for temporary contracts.
Further analysis could assess the robustness of the above findings as the time series
coverage of the LABREF database expands. Forthcoming analyses could also dig deeper
into the policy breakdown allowed by the LABREF database with a view to better
understand reform patterns in terms of composition by specific policy instruments.
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1Sources used to compile LABREF include the ILO databases, information
published by EIRO (European Industrial Relations Observatory of the Dublin
Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions), information
published by the European Labour Law Network, reports by the European
Employment Observatory, country reports by the OECD and IMF, National Ac-
tion Plans for Employment annually set-up in the framework of the Employment
Strategy, National Reform Programmes under the Lisbon Strategy, national legis-
lation and other information available from the websites of the EU Ministries for
Employment and Social Affairs.
2The link is: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1143&intPageId=3193&
langId=en.
3In particular, reported reforms also encompass framework agreements among social
partners, social pacts and tripartite agreements involving government, trade unions,
and employers’ federations.
4A single piece of legislation may cover several policy areas and may consequently
include several ‘reforms’ to be recorded in LABREF.
5An example could be a complex tax reform which includes both significant cuts
(e.g., rate cuts) and increases (e.g., elimination of tax credits) in the Personal Income
Tax system.
6The analysis is based on the country taxonomy proposed by Esping-Andersen
(1990), where countries are classified into five groups on the basis of socio-
economic systems. This classification covers 22 EU countries which are classified
into five groups on the basis of principal component analysis. The five remaining
EU countries were allocated as follows: Malta and Cyprus were allocated to the
Anglo-Saxon group of countries, Luxembourg to the Continental group; Romania
and Latvia to the Central, Eastern group of countries. Note that in the Esping-
Andersen taxonomy, the Netherlands is classified as a Nordic country, while Greece
is classified as an Eastern country.
7The data base is available under link http://www.frdb.org/language/eng/topic/data-
sources/dataset/international-data/doc_pk/9027.
8For instance, composite reforms may be broken down to a different number of
reform measures by different databases depending on their systems of classification. It
is possible that the same reform is recorded in different years in different databases. It
appears that generally LABREF records more reforms measures than the FRDB-IZA
database.
9See, e.g., Deroose and Turrini (2005), Duval (2008), and Buti et al. (2009) for a re-
view of arguments for a possible trade-off between fiscal consolidation and structural
reforms and for empirical evidence.
10Political control variables are derived from the Database of Political Institutions
by the World Bank (Beck et al. 2001). Other variables, including government ideol-
ogy and the number of years since the last election, were tested and not selected as
generally exhibiting non-significant coefficients.
11The real interest rate spread is chosen rather than the nominal as the latter
may be due to factors different than perceived default risk; notably inflation
differentials.
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The database covers 52 labour market and welfare policy fields which are grouped in 9
broad policy domains as follows:
1. Labour taxation1. Employers’ social security contributions
2. Employees’ social security contributions
3. Social security contributions of the self-employed
4. Income tax
5. Labour taxation - Other
2. Unemployment benefits
6. Net replacement rate
7. Duration of unemployment benefits
8. Coverage and eligibility
9. Search and job availability requirements
10. Unemployment benefits - Other
3. Other welfare-related benefits
11. Short-time working schemes
12. In-work benefits (employment conditional benefit or tax credit)
13. Social assistance (housing, means-tested benefits)
14. Sickness schemes
15. Family-related benefits
4. Active labour market programmes
16. Public Employment Services (job assistance, job-counselling etc.)
17. Training
18. Direct job creation and employment subsidies
19. Employment subsidies
20. Special schemes for the disabled
21. Special schemes for youth
22. Active labour market policies - Other
5. Job protection
a) Permanent contracts23. Procedural requirements
24. Notice and severance payments
25. Definition of fair dismissal
26. Permanent contracts - Other
b) Temporary contracts
27. Maximum number of renewals of fixed-term contracts
28. Maximum duration of fixed-term contracts
29. Temporary agency work
30. Definition of valid reasons for fixed-term contracts
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7. Wage Setting
35. Statutory minima (only derogations from existing rules and practice or changes
in minimum wage setting modalities).
36. Social pacts, bipartite or tripartite framework agreements on wage setting
37. Regulation by the government of the wage bargaining framework (e.g.
extension of collective agreements, representativeness of social partners, etc.)
38. Public wages (only derogations from existing rules and practice affecting
large parts of the public sector or changes in wage setting modalities
in substantial shares in general government or SOEs)
39. Wage setting - Other
8. Working time
40. Working hours management
41. Part-time work
42. Family-related working-time organisation
43. Sabbatical and other special leave schemes
44. Working time - Other
9. Immigration and mobility
a) Immigration45. Immigration control
46. Selective Immigration policies
47. Measure to facilitate labour market integration of immigrants
b) Mobility
48. Internal mobility
49. Mobility – OtherAppendix B: Definition of reform direction
Reforms with an increasing direction are defined as follows (a symmetric definition ap-
plies to “decreasing” reforms):
▪ Labour taxation: measures increasing the tax burden on labour.
▪ Unemployment benefits: measures increasing the generosity of unemployment
benefits (replacement rates, duration, coverage) or easing entitlement conditions.
▪ Other welfare-related benefits: measures increasing the generosity of benefits or
easing entitlement conditions.
▪ Active labour market programmes: measures aiming at increasing the availability,
generosity, or effectiveness of ALMPs.
▪ Job protection (EPL): measures increasing protection against job dismissals:
strengthening procedural requirements, increasing notice and severance payments,
strengthening the definition of fair dismissal, or restricting the conditions for the
use of temporary contracts and temporary agency work—but also, measures
increasing rights and working conditions of workers.
▪ Early withdrawal schemes: measures increasing the generosity of early withdrawal
schemes (early retirement or disability benefits) or easing eligibility conditions.
▪ Wage setting: legislation or agreements tightening framework conditions for wage
setting on the part of employers.
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time, increasing rights and conditions of part-time workers, tightening availability
of or access to childcare, increasing generosity or duration of parental/paternity/
maternity leaves, or increasing access to sabbatical or educational leaves.
▪ Immigration and mobility: measures tightening regulatory restrictions on migration
or reducing support to mobility.
Appendix C: Definition and sources of explanatory variables in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7
Macroeconomic, fiscal, and labour market variables
 Per-capita GDP in 2000: measured in EUR 1000 (source: AMECO Database,
European Commission, DG ECFIN)
 Unemployment rate: fraction on labour force 15-64 year (source: AMECO
Database, European Commission, DG ECFIN)
 Net lending of general government, %GDP (source: AMECO Database, European
Commission, DG ECFIN)
 Real interest spread: spread over Germany for interest rates on 10-year government
bonds, ex-post adjustment for inflation (source: AMECO Database, European
Commission, DG ECFIN)
Political variables
 Election years, years following parliamentary elections. Source: World Bank’s Database
of Political Institutions (DPI, described by Beck et al., 2001). The variable legelec is
used to determine the years of legislative elections. Some modifications are made to
correct erroneous information in the dataset.
 Fraction of seats held by the government in parliament: Variable derived from the
World Bank’s DPI as the ratio of the number of seats held by the government
(variable numgov in the DPI) and the total seats in parliament (totalseats).
Policy variables
 Tax wedge: average tax wedge of a married individual in a one-earner couple earning
the average wage, with two children (source: OECD).
 Net replacement rate of unemployment benefits: Calculated as the average of four
time points through the unemployment spell (the 2nd, 13th , 25th, and 60th
month), for an individual in a one-earner couple with two children earning 100%
of the average wage. (Own calculations based on OECD).
 EPL index for regular contracts and for temporary contracts: (source: OECD).
 ALMP spending: expenditure on active labour policies as a percentage of GDP
(source: OECD).
Dummy variables
 Dummy variable for an output gap lower than minus 4% of GDP: This variable is
generated based on the European Commission’s estimate of the output gap
(source: AMECO Database, European Commission, DG ECFIN).
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member of the euro area or has a currency board. (Own calculations.)
 New Member State Dummy: Takes the value of 1 (in all years) for countries that
joined the European Union in 2004 or later. (Own calculations.)
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